




Director of
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


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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

2 February 1979

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USSR: Views on European Security Talks

Soviet officials have recently expressed strong reservations about the year-old French proposal for a conference to negotiate proportional reductions in conventional armaments by all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act in a zone extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals." The Soviets object to this zone and to the exclusion from the agenda of nuclear weapons and naval forces. Moscow also fears that the proposed conference would disrupt the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks and prefer to expand the discussion of security issues at the Review Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which meets in Madrid in 1980.

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A senior French representative who held talks in Moscow in mid-January characterized the latest Soviet response to the French proposal as "very negative" but less than a total rejection. The Soviets, however, had never before been so direct or explicit in their criticism. Moscow's harder line probably is calculated to disabuse the French of the feasibility of their proposed conference while encouraging Paris to pursue its arms control objectives at the CSCE Review Conference and by joining the MBFR talks.

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TURKEY-LIBYA: Cooperation Agreements

The agreements reached during Prime Minister Ecevit's recent visit to Libya, if implemented, could slightly ease Turkey's serious oil shortage and provide some needed capital to bolster its shaky economy. The Turks remain suspicious of Libya's radical and anti-Western outlook, however, and the overall relationship between the two countries is not likely to improve markedly.

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[REDACTED]

Ecevit's trip, which had been pending since Libyan Prime Minister Jallud visited Ankara last February, was made primarily for economic reasons. Its timing may also have been calculated to improve Ecevit's domestic political image. [REDACTED]

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In the new agreements, Libya promised to deliver an additional 3 million tons of oil this year and next and to extend unspecified amounts of emergency financial aid to Turkey in cooperation with other Islamic countries. In return, Libya is to receive more Turkish workers, and the Turks will augment their training program for Libyan military personnel. The two governments also plan an expansion of joint scientific, agricultural, and industrial endeavors. [REDACTED]

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The Turks depend on the oil and aid they receive from Libya, while Libya needs Turkish workers and military training. The Turks, however, remain suspicious of Libyan President Qadhafi, who has hinted that Libyan aid will be cut off unless Turkey leaves NATO; he openly advocates a homeland for the Kurdish minorities in Turkey and neighboring countries. The Turks also know that Libya has reneged on past promises and are not likely to count on either the aid or the oil until it actually arrives.

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AFGHANISTAN: Tribal Unrest

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[REDACTED] violent opposition to the government of Afghanistan may be spreading, possibly in reaction to the nine-month-old leftist regime's arrest of religious leaders and its efforts to implement land reform. The government has been unable to quell the tribal revolt under way in Nangarhar Province and recently sent reinforcements to mountainous Oruzgan Province. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] assert that clashes have occurred recently in Oruzgan and also in Parvan Province north of Kabul. There also has been unrest in and around the southern city of Qandahar, and the city remains tense. While tribal opposition probably presents little threat to the government in the short term, it does represent a potentially dangerous trend. Opposition to the regime seems to be growing, and successful resistance could encourage other disaffected groups to act against the government. [REDACTED]

TURKEY: Progovernment Editor's Murder

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The murder in Istanbul yesterday of one of Turkey's most prominent newsmen, Apti Ipekci, may indicate that some rightwing extremist groups have now begun targeting members of the Turkish establishment. If so, additional assassinations of prominent Turks are likely. No group has claimed responsibility for the murder, but the government believes rightists were involved. Martial law authorities may institute more repressive crackdowns on extremist groups. Ipekci was the editor of the moderate, progovernment daily *Milliyet*, and a long-time confidant of Prime Minister Ecevit and other leading Turkish politicians. [REDACTED]

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ROMANIA: Leadership Shakeup

//Emil Bobu, a powerful party secretary, was the chief loser in the major Romanian party and government shakeup this week. He was demoted to lesser posts in the government and the trade union apparatus. Although Bobu has been a close associate of President Ceausescu's wife, his decline does not seem to reflect a change in her position as in effect the second most powerful person in the regime. The former party secretary for foreign relations, Vasile Musat, who replaced Foreign Minister Andrei in that capacity less than a year ago, also was demoted. Musat's fall suggests that Andrei remains President Ceausescu's foremost adviser on foreign policy matters. The latest personnel changes are in line with Ceausescu's policies of periodically rotating top officials.// [REDACTED]

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